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N A T U R E OF CASE
These are three consolidated actions brought by
residents of Salt Lake County against the State of
Utah, Salt Lake County and Gibbons & Reed Company
to recover for damage to their properties which occurred in connection with an extremely heavy cloudburst
in August, 1969. The claim of plaintiff Robert P .
Kunkel, et ux., relates also to a separate rainstorm
which occurred in April, 1969. Cross-claims were filed
by the State of Utah and Salt Lake County against
Gibbons & Reed, which in turn counterclaimed against
the cross-claimants.
DISPOSITION IN L O W E R COURT
The matter was tried, as to the liability issues only,
before a jury, with the Honorable Ernest F . Baldwin,
Jr., presiding. At the conclusion of an eleven-day trial,
the matter was submitted to the jury on special interrogatories. As noted in plaintiffs' brief, the jury found
that the highway project of defendant State of Utah
was unreasonably defective or dangerous. They also
found that defendant Salt Lake County had unreasonably created a defective or dangerous condition in the
utilization of its storm drains and that it was negligent
in failing to provide reasonably adequate drainage facilities for the highway project. Thus, the jury found
all issues against those defendants and in favor of the
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' statement as to the disposition of
the matter in the lower court seems calculated to give
*>
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the impression that the jury also found all issues
against defendant Gibbons & Reed. However, this is
not true. Six interrogatories were found in favor of
this defendant. Plaintiffs' treatment of this aspect of
the matter is, at best, misleading and unfair.
At the conclusion of two hearings following the
trial, the trial court ruled that the State of Utah was
liable for the damages to all plaintiffs as a result of the
flood, but that Salt Lake County and Gibbons & Reed
were not liable for such damages. The court also ruled
that Gibbons & Reed was not liable under the crossclaims of the State of Utah and Salt Lake County.
An amended order and judgment incorporating such
rulings was entered on May 15, 1974.

NATURE OF RELIEF
SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-respondent Gibbons & Reed Company
seeks affirmance of the order and judgment of the
trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
While it may be somewhat natural for an advocate
to emphasize most strongly the facts that support his
position, plaintiffs' brief carries that tendency to an
unwarranted extreme. There is, in fact, almost a total
disregard of any facts which favor Gibbons & Reed and
support the actions of the trial court. For that reason,
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Gibbons & Reed deems it necessary to bring to the
court's attention a number of other facts which, it believes, will disclose to the court the basis for the rulings
of the court below.
First, the construction phase of the highway project, Interstate 215, was preceded by many years of
planning and study, particularly as to the drainage aspects (T. 1621, T. 1698, T. 1767). As noted by plaintiffs, Salt Lake County retained a prominent engineering firm, Caldwell, Richards and Sorenson, to prepare a Master Storm Drain Study in 1964 (T. 162123). Thereafter, another prominent engineering firm,
Nielson & Maxwell, made further studies and completed the design of the drainage system (T. 16981700). The highway project, including the drainage
system, was then designed by a consulting engineering
firm, Rader & Associates, of Miami, Florida, (T.
1719). Finally, the detailed engineering and designing
of the drainage facilities was performed by specialists
in the Department of Highways (T. 1741). Many
months of design work were spent by the department's
hydraulic engineer and others even after the numerous
studies and engineering work that had been accomplished earlier (T. 1767). Gibbons & Reed had only
three weeks after receipt of the plans and specifications
to complete and submit its bid for the construction of
the highway project, including the relocation of numerous utilities and installation of the drainage facilities
(T..1776).
4
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At the time of the flood, the drainage system had
been fully completed and was in operation (T. 1481.
T. 1556, T. 1589, T. 1802). This included various inlets and other aspects of the drainage systems to the
east of the highway project (T. 1589, T. 1774, T.
1803). That system was expected to handle all of the
runoff water which fell above the project (T. 1766, T.
1773-4). Curbing had not yet been installed on the
west side of relocated Wasatch Boulevard. However,
the center crest in Wasatch Boulevard is more than
six-inches high (T. 1778), so the only water that the
curb would have contained would have been that which
fell between it and the crest, a relatively nominal
amount (T. 1761, T. 1788).
As a number of photographs so graphically depict,
the flood was of such immense proportions that a sixinch curb would have done little, if any, good (Exh.
101D ,104D, 105D, 107D). The photographs further
show that in the area where there were curbs, they were
completely filled with silt (Exh. 94D, 96D, 97D), and
this was above the project where no construction had
taken place. The west cutbanks, which were not subjected to the heavy floods from above, withstood the
same rains with virtually no damage (Exh. 67-69P).
This same photographic evidence, coupled with testimony from the Department of Highway's project engineer (T. 1516-17, T. 1556) also disclosed that no
amount of precautions by Gibbons & Reed would have
served to "protect the project" from the devastating
waters that poured over the east cutbank.
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The evidence was undisputed that Gibbons & Reed
constructed the highway project entirely in accordance
with the plans and specifications furnished by the State
of Utah (T. 1556, 1584). There were no deviations
from these plans and specifications and no problems
arose during the construction in connection with the
scheduling of the work by Gibbons & Reed (T. 1409,
R. 350-380). All work was done in accordance with
directions from the project engineer and his staff (T.
1407, T. 1448, R. 335-36). There were numerous inspectors on the job at all times, inspecting every aspect
of the construction (T. 1406, T. 1792). All work was
staked by the Department of Highways and Gibbons
& Reed was required to follow these stakes within tolerances of a quarter of an inch (T. 1974).
Plaintiffs argue that while Gibbons & Reed constructed the highway project in accordance with plans
and specifications and at the State's direction, it had
discretion as to the sequence in which it accomplished
various steps of the project. This argument is correct
only to a very limited degree. I t does not take into consideration either the inspection processes or the realities
of construction work. The project could not be completed in a single stroke and the normal sequencing of
events, required by good construction practices, dictated the order in which work was to be done (T. 1239,
T. 1488, T. 1575, T. 1790). There are only two matters,
for example, which could have any possible significance in connection with plaintiffs' appeal. One is the
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fact that the concrete ditch liners had not been installed
at the time of the flood. However, the evidence was
clear that the concrete travel lands were just being
poured and that it was necessary to then install asphalt
shoulders and to grade from the shoulders to the surface
on which the concrete ditch liners would be installed
(T. 1488, T. 1790). l
Similar sequencing problems prevented the installation of the curb on relocated Wasatch Boulevard. At
the time of the flood, it was still necessary to install
a high chain-link right-of-way fence (T. 1804) and
part of the topsoil (T. 1411). This had to be completed before the curb was installed in order to prevent
damage to the curb from vehicles and posthole diggers
which would be required to install the fence. (T. 1804).
In any event, as indicated above, there was no evidence
showing that installation of such curb would have prevented any damage.
Wliile plaintiffs make other arguments regarding
the so called "protection of the project" during construction, these arguments are either disputed by the
evidence or are grounded upon pure speculation. They
argue, for example, that no grates had been placed
over the storm drain laterals. The evidence is clear that
such grates were not called for and the inlets were ini In any case, the jury specifically found that Gibbons & Reed
Company had not failed to take reasonable precautions to provide proper drainage during the construction of the project
(Int. J(2)).
7
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stalled in accordance with the plans, specifications and
directions of the State of Utah (T. 1743-45). The inlets had no provisions to accommodate grates (T. 1515,
T. 1581), and to have installed grates would have been
in violation of the plans and specifications (T. 1553).
Moreover, the weight of the evidence indicated that such
grates would have had a tendency to plug-up sooner
than uncovered inlets (T. 1555, T. 1768, T. 1857).
Plaintiffs also contend that no grass, sod or other materials had been placed, permanently or temporarily,
to prevent erosion of the cutbank. There was no provision for installation of sod and the State would not
allow the cutbank to be seeded until after September
1st (T. 1578). In any event, the photographs again
graphically illustrate that neither sod nor seed would
have had any effect (Exh. 39D, 94-95D, 97D, 101105D). But beyond that, plaintiffs have ignored the
fact that at the time of the flood the cutbanks had been
graded to final level and Gibbons & Reed was in the
process of spreading topsoil on them (T. 1411-15).
Thus, it would have been impossible to have had the
banks covered with sod, seed, burlap or anything else.
The contract between the State of Utah and Gibbons & Reed provided that the latter would be responsible for any storm damages unless the storm was of
such unusual violence as to constitute an unforeseeable
cause beyond the contractor's control, in which case the
State would be responsible (T. 1447-8). In the present
case, the State had paid Gibbons & Reed under such

8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

contractual provision for all of the reconstruction work
following the flood (T. 1829).
The damage sustained by plaintiffs Kunkel in
April came from an entirely different drainage area
and occurred before the engineering system had been
installed and was functioning (T. 1373). The jury
found that Gibbons & Reed had no liability as to the
Kunkels (R. 727).
The storm which resulted in the flooding was of
unusual intensity. Meteorologist Mark Eubank, called
by the State of Utah, testified that it exceeded all other
recorded storms in the State of Utah (T. 1612, T.
1615) with two and one-half inches of water falling
in approximately thirty minutes (T. 1600, T. 1615).
Even plaintiffs' witness, a long-time meteorologist in
the State, testified that he knew of only one or two
local storms which would equal it in intensity (T. 1319).
The project engineer for the Department of Highways,
who had been in charge of many highway projects,
testified that no highway project on which he had ever
been associated had sustained the amount of flood damage the present one did (T. 1517), although during its
construction a number of heavy rainstorms had occurred which had resulted in very little damage (T. 1556).
Despite a great amount of silt deposited at the lower
terminus of the project, there was actually very little
erosion along the medians or shoulders themselves (T.
1577, T. 1806).

9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Finally, Mr. Knowlton, the project engineer testified that he had given the matter considerable thought
and couldn't think of any measures that could have
been taken which would have accommodated the runoff water to which the project was subjected (T. 1516).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
Under the evidence adduced at the trial, defendant
Gribbons <§ Reed Company could not be held liable to
plaintiffs for the flood damages sustained by them.
Plaintiffs conclude their brief by arguing for application of the doctrine of inverse condemnation. In
doing so, they call attention to the fact that they sustained a disproportionate loss as a result of the construction of a needed public improvement. In other
words, they sustained damage because the State of
Utah found it necessary to construct a modern highway
project in proximity to their homes. This really is the
crux of the matter. From the evidence it is clear that
flood damage to plaintiffs was caused by the interaction of three factors, none of which were the responsibility of Gibbons & Reed. The first was the decision
by the State of Utah to bisect the area above plaintiffs
with the interstate highway. The second was the residential development of the area which disturbed the
10
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natural drainage channels.2 The third was the occurrence of the torrential cloudburst. In short, there was
no evidence to indicate that Gibbons & Reed did anything other than what it was lawfully retained by the
State of Utah to do. Rather, the evidence is undisputed that it constructed the highway project in accordance with its contract with the State.
The law is quite clear that under these circumstances, a contractor has no liability for damages that
may result to third parties, even if such damages arose
out of or in connection with the construction, especially
where the construction is a public work being performed
by a governmental authority, as it was in this case. The
general rule in Utah in this regard is set forth in Len~
inger v. Steams-Roger Mfg. Co., 17 U.2d 37, 404 P.2d
33 (1965), as follows:
An important limitation on the rule placing
building contractors on the same footing as sellers of goods is that the contractor is not liable
if he has merely carried out the plans, specifications and directions given him, since in that case
the responsibility is assumed by the employer,
at least where the plans are not so obviously
dangerous that no reasonable man would follow
them. (4(MP.2d33at36.)
A case involving the construction of a public highway supporting the rule of Steams-Roger is Marin
2 As stated by plaintiffs* own expert, Mr. Jacobsen, "Man's development of this area has created a large part of the problem."
(T. 1221).

11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Municipal Water District v. Peninsula Paving Co., 34
Cal. App. 2d 647, 94 P.2d 404 (1939). There the state's
engineers and the defendant contractor knew of the
existence of a pipeline. The contract provided that the
contractor should take every precaution to preserve and
protect the lines from injury or damage during construction. The evidence, however, showed that the work
of the defendant was planned by the State engineers
and the construction was supervised and directed them.
I t also showed that the work conformed to the plans
and specifications furnished by the State and that everything done by the contractor was approved by the
State's engineers.
In reversing a judgment against the contractor
the court said:
. . . So far as the contractor is conerned, the
proper rule of liability is thus stated in Northwestern Pac. R. B. Co. v. Currie, 100 Cal. App.
173...:
Where a county contracts for the doing of
construction work according to plans and specifications theretofore adopted, and the contractor performs the work with proper care
and skill and in conformity with the plans and
specifications, but the work thus planned and
specified results in an injury to adjacent property, the liability, if any there is, for the payment of damages is upon the county under its
obligation to compensate the damages resulting from the exercise of its governmental
power . . . (94 P.2d 404 at 406.)

12
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The court noted that it is only where the contractor
departs from the plans and specifications or performs
the work in an improper or negligent manner that he
becomes liable to third parties. Inasmuch as there was
no testimony from a highway engineer to show that the
defendant had performed the work in an improper manner and it was undisputed that the work had been done
in accordance with the plans and specifications, there
was no evidence to support the finding of negligence on
the part of the defendant. In so ruling, the court noted
that a provision in the contract that the contractor
should preserve and protect the pipeline "in no way
enlarged the liability of the contractor to third persons."
A recent case from a neighboring jurisdiction is
Gates v. Pickett § Nelson Const. Co., 94 Idaho 836,
432 P.2d 780 (1967), which, after adopting the general
rule that a contractor who performs according to the
plans and specifications is not liable for damage resulting from such construction, noted that the rule was
particularly applicable where the work was directly
supervised by the State of Idaho through the resident
engineer of its Highway Department.
Other decisions demonstrate that the rule followed
by this court in Steams-Roger is even more applicable
where a public project is involved. These cases hold
that after a public authority engineers a project, it is
not in the public interest to require the contractor to
re-engineer it. This, the courts note, would substantially increase the cost of public projects and hence
13
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the contractor is under a duty to perform according to
the plans and specifications furnished it. Unless they
are patently defective, it is not the contractor's duty,
or even its prerogative, to question the adequacy of
such plans and specifications.
Thus, in Wood v. Foster § Creighton Co., 191
Tenn. 478, 235 S.W.2d 1 (1950), suit was brought
against the contractor for removal of soil and trees resulting from the sloping of a cutbank during the construction of a highway. The court noted that the State
Engineer had gone on the lots and placed stakes indicating removal of the soil and trees and the sloping of
the cutbank. In reversing the decisions of the trial and
intermediate appellate courts, the court stated:

'

I t seems to us that as a practical matter in
construction of public improvement, the contractor should be relieved from checking every
order given it by the public authority. The state
for whom the contractor works, does the engineering, stakes out the project, tells the contractor
what grade and what to do and so long as the
contractor complies with these instructions by
its superior then the contractor is fulfilling its
obligation. If the contractor was required, at its
peril, to check and double check all plans given
it and required to keep an engineering force
for the purpose of interpreting these plans,
and was not permitted to follow the orders of
the engineering force or its superior, then the
costs of public improvement would be so increased as to make them almost prohibitive. The
purpose of having the State Engineering De14
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partment for these public improvements is to lay
out these projects and to tell the contractor
where to do its work. The contractor's work is
not the engineering job of laying out the project, but is merely in doing what it is instructed
to do. So long as it does this work as it is instructed to do by its superior in a workmanlike
manner, not negligently, then the contractor is
not liable. (235 S.W.2d 1 at 2, emphasis added).
A similar case is Southeast Construction Co. v.
Ellis, 233 Ark. 72, 342 S.W.2d 485 (1961). In that
case Southeast Construction entered into a contract
with the State of Arkansas to make changes in an
existing highway. The plans and specifications were
prepared by the Arkansas Highway Department.
Plaintiffs alleged that during the course of construction, defendant Southeast deposited waste material in
a negligent fashion, resulting in damage to the plaintiffs. The trial court found in favor of plaintiffs and
defendant appealed. On appeal Southeast relied on
the single point that the undisputed testimony showed
that the deposit of waste material by it was done in
accordance with the specifications and instructions of
Arkansas Highway Department and, therefore, the
trial court erred in entering judgment for the plaintiffs.
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Supreme
Court of Arkansas noted:
. . . Appellants compliance with plans and
specifications prepared by the Highway Department cannot be deemed to constitute negligence
15
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(342S.W.2d485at488).
The court then went on to approve an instruction
that if the defendant performed the construction in
accordance with its contract and the governmental authority and "with that degree of skill that is ordinarily
possessed and exercised by contractors doing the same
or similar work" it could not be held liable to plaintiffs. The court concluded:
The appellee has been damaged. H e should
be compensated for his damages by the responsible governmental body rather than by the contractor who was obligated by his contract to perform according to the proper directions, plans
and specifications furnished by the State Highway Department. (342 S.W.2d 485 at 488).
In Engler v. Aldridge, 75 P.2d 290 (Kan. 1938),
the court ruled that a contractor on a state highway
project was obligated by his contract and bond to
perform according to the plans and specifications and
that he could neither change the plans nor quit the
work, even if he believed the improvement was bad
from an engineering standpoint.
In the present case the jury's finding that Gibbons & Reed constructed the highway project strictly
in accordance with the plans, specifications and directions of the project cannot be disputed. The State has
unequivocally indicated that there was no deviation by
the contractor and plaintiffs have introduced no evid16
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ence to the contrary. Indeed, it is interesting to note
that there is nothing in the plaintiffs' entire argument
relating to the standard of care of a contractor under
the circumstances of this case. And, no where in their
brief do plaintiffs provide a standard contrary to that
set forth in the above decisions.

ARGUMENT
POINT II
The jury's findings and answers to interrogatories
which related to issues of fact and which were supported
by competant evidence exonerated Gibbons § Reed
Company and the trial court acted properly in granting
judgment in its favor.
Having examined the standard of care and the circumstances under which a contractor in the position of
Gibbons & Reed will be held liable for damages to third
parties, it becomes evident that the actions of the court
below were proper and should be affirmed.
First, however, it is necessary to note the serious
omissions in plaintiff's brief. As to Gibbons & Reed,
plaintiffs have conveniently disregarded two very important factors. They make repeated references to a
finding that Gibbons & Reed Company was negligent
"in failing to take reasonable precautions to protect the
project during construction", but make not mention
17
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whatsoever of the fact that all other — more specific —
interrogatories were answered in Gibbons & Reed's favor. Secondly, they make repeated references to the
jury's "verdict." They attempt to make this court understand that the trial court disregarded or overruled
the jury's verdict. However, the record clearly shows
that this was not the case. There was no general verdict.
The matter was submitted to the jury on written interrogatories under Rule 49(a), U.R.C.P. Consequently,
the cases relied upon by plaintiffs to the effect that a
jury verdict is not to be lightly set aside are not pertinent. These cases involve situations where a general
verdict had been returned by the jury, upheld by the
trial court and appellant had maintained on appeal
that the evidence did not support the verdict. These
cases, in fact, generally note that the trial court is in
a more favorable position to observe the demeanor of
witnesses and the like and thus the presumption, on the
part of the appellate court, is in favor of the validity
of the jury's verdict.
The case of Mason v. Mason, 108 Utah 428, 160
P.2d 730 (1945), cited by plaintiffs is equally irrelevant. That case involved a trial without a jury and
the interrelation of the findings and conclusions to the
judgment. I t had nothing whatsoever to do with the
issues presented here. In fact, the only cases cited by
plaintiffs which dealt with written interrogatories under
Rule 49(a) is First Security Bank v. Ezra C. Lwtdahl,
Inc., 22 U.2d 433, 454 P.2d 886 (1969). And, as will
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be pointed out below, this case actually supports Gibbons & Reed, not plaintiffs.
Returning to the special interrogatories which were
ignored in plaintiffs' brief, it will be seen that in light
of the applicable law, the jury exculpated Gibbons &
Reed. The jury found:
1. That the highway project of the State of Utah,
including the storm drainage system, was unreasonably
defective or dangerous (Int. A. T. 721).
2. Gibbons & Reed constructed the highway in
conformance with the plans, specifications and directions given to it by the State of Utah (Int. L, T. 729).
3. Gibbons & Reed did not negligently follow
plans, specifications and directions that were so obviously dangerous that no reasonable contractor would
have followed them (Int. M, T. 729).
4. Gibbons & Reed performed the work required
by its contract with the State of Utah with that degree
of skill and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by
contractors doing the same or similar work in this
locality (Int. O, T. 729).
5. Gibbons & Reed was not negligent in failing to
take reasonable precautions to provide proper dr linage during the construction of the project (Int. J 2 , T.
728).
6. Gibbons & Reed did not negligently collect and
divert flood water into the low point of the highway
19
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project (Int. C, T. 725).
Additionally, the jury found that Gibbons & Reed
was not negligent in any manner with respect to the
flooding of the Kunkel property (Int. F , T, 727).
Thus, it can readily be seen that contrary to plaintiffs' contentions, there was not a verdict in favor of
plaintiffs and against this defendant. Consequently,
there was no need for a motion for a judgment n.o.v.,
Gibbons & Reed had twice moved, under Rule 50(b)
for a directed verdict and had made a motion for a judgment in its favor on the interrogatories (T. 1455, T.
1861, R. 739-40). The trial court, in its discretion,
chose to consider and reconcile all of the findings of
the jury and in doing so, properly granted judgment
for Gibbons & Reed.
The trial court's actions were justified on several
well-recognized grounds; the first and foremost of which
is lack of any substantial evidence to support the finding.
The general rule is stated in 76 Am. Jur. 2d,
Trials, Section 1203:
. . . Where there is no evidence to support it,
a finding as to a fact included within the issues
is not required or proper, since it is not the office
of a special verdict to find expressly on the
issues, but only to find facts proved which are
within the issues. In the absence of evidence to
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support a material finding, it may be set aside
or stricken from the record, and in the discretion
of the court, judgment may be entered in accordance with the undisputed evidence in the case or
the verdict may be set aside entirely and a new
trial granted.
The rule is supported by numerous cases. For
example in Anchor Casualty Co. v. McGowan, 168
Fed.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1948), the jury had answered
special interrogatories in favor of the appellant. The
trial court thereafter entered an order striking the
jury's answers to Interrogatories Nos. 16 through 19.
The appellant maintained that the court was powerless
to set aside the findings or to change them, and that
the most it could do was set aside the verdict and grant
a new trial. In rejecting this contention (applying the
federal counterpart to Rule 49(a)), the court stated:
There is no evidence in the record to support
the jury's finding on special issues Nos. 16
through 19 . . . [They] should have not been
submitted to the jury.
The fact that they were submitted and the
jury answered [sic] is, however, harmless error
There is no inconsistency in the jury's findings; the fault lies in the fact that there was no
evidence to support its findings on special issues
Nos. 16 through 19. In such a case the court is
justified in disregarding those of the jury's findings which are without support in the evidence
and which are immaterial to the court's judgment.
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Another case is Thompson § Kelly Co. v. TJnited
States M •<$ S Ins. Co., 160 N . E . 668 (Mass. 1928),
in which the court stated:
There was no error of law in disregarding the
answer of the jury to the question in connection
with the other two cases . . .
I n our opinion, the finding of the jury in
answer to this question was not warranted by
the evidence and the judge was justified in ruling as he did.
In Gelfand v. Strohecker, 150 Fed. Supp. 655
(N.D. Ohio 1956), the court held that an interrogatory
which merely sought to determine if the defendant was
negligent was one calling for a conclusion and continued :
Even if such an interrogatory had been proper, a finding of the jury that the defendant was
negligent in any respect would not be supported
by the evidence.
See also Slaton v. Union Electric Ry. Co., 145
P.2d 456 (Kan. 1944); Lynch v. City of Jamesville,
204 N.W.2d 6 (Wis. 1973); Wintersberger v. Pioneer
Iron <$ Metal Co., 94 N.W.2d 136 (Wis. 1959). In the
latter case the court stated:
If there is no credible evidence to sustain a
jury's finding or answer, the trial court may and
should change it.
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The rule has been recognized by this court in Koer
v. May fair Markets, 19 U.2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967).
In the Koer case the rule was actually extended much
further than it need be here. The jury had answered
all interrogatories in favor of the plaintiff, but the trial
court, upon motion for directed verdict, disregarded
the answers and granted judgment in favor of the
defendant. This court affirmed on the basis that there
was no substantial evidence to support the findings.
In the present case, there was absolutely no evidence adduced by the plaintiffs to establish that Gibbons
& Reed was negligent in failing to protect the project.
The only possible evidence in this regard related to the
drainage system and lack of grates. But the jury
specifically found that Gibbons & Reed was not negligent in failing to take reasonable precautions to provide proper drainage during the construction project
(Int. J ( 2 ) ) . Thus, the finding under J ( l ) would
have had to relate to something other than the drainage
facilities. Yet a careful review of the record will indicate that there were no other areas where Gibbons
& Reed could be held responsible, particularly in light
of the jury's answer to Interrogatories L, M and O.
Indeed, the complaint itself would not even support
such a finding. The trial proceeded on plaintiffs' first
and second causes of action and these would in no way
put Gibbons & Reed on notice that plaintiffs were
claiming damage for alleged "failure to protect the
project." The interrogatory was, in fact, not even
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requested by plaintiffs, but by the State of Utah in
connection with its cross-claim. The only mention by
plaintiffs of any such failure was when plaintiffs attorney was allowed to read a portion of the specifications between the State and Gibbons & Reed which
provided that the contractor would take precautions to
protect the project during construction (T. 1446-51 ). 3
But, as noted in Marin Municipal Water District v.
Peninsula Paving Co., supra:
The provision of the contract between the
State and defendant, above quoted, that the
contractor should preserve and protect the pipeline, in no way enlarged the liability of the contractor to third persons. (94 P.2d 404 at 406)
Despite plaintiffs' persistent argument that the
trial court abused its discretion in disregarding the
answer to Interrogatory J (1), its contentions as to the
manner in which that answer was supported by the
evidence are limited (Pis. Brief pp. 31-33). Most of
them have been answered, but will be touched upon
here in the order that they were made. As to the removal of the curb along Wasatch Boulevard, it was necessary for Gibbons & Reed to remove and relocate Wasatch Boulevard in order to conform to its contract with
3 The provision expressly excluded damage due to unforeseeable
causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence
of the contractor. A previous provision also provided that the
contractor would not be responsible for damage to property due
to design failure (T. 1446).
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the State of Utah. Old Wasatch had previously occupied the ground upon which the freeway was built (T.
1472, T. 1561). Apart from the fact that there was no
evidence to show that the small curb would have done
anything towards holding back the torrential rainfall,
there was no evidence to establish that Gibbons &
Reed was negligent in following the normal sequencing procedures. And since, in a more specific finding
(Int. No. 0), the jury found that Gibbons & Reed
had performed the contract in accordance with the
degree of care and skill customarily exercised by road
contractors, the conclusion argued by plaintiffs is not
justified.
Plaintiffs' contention regarding the concrete ditch
liners has been answered previously, but it is also covered by the answers under the specific interrogatories,
particularly No. 0. Plaintiffs' only other contentions
relate to the drainage system, which the jury resolved
against them, is the alleged failure to plant grass or
sod. This is also explained by the fact that its contract would not allow Gibbons & Reed to plant until
after September 1st and, certainly, there was no evidence of any kind that it should have covered the cutbanks with some other type of material pending the
planting of such grass. Nor have plaintiffs ever explained how this would have done any earthly good in
protecting the project from the raging waters pouring
over the east cutbank or how it could have been accomplished while placing topsoil on the banks.
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Finally, at the end of the trial there was some testimony by Mr. Jacobsen that upon one job with which
he was familiar "ditch riders" had been employed.
However, a review of that testimony (T. 1853) will
disclose that it constituted no evidence at all as to the
standard Gibbons & Reed, or anyone else, should have
followed. Plaintiffs contend their argument as to Gibbons & Reed by a somewhat inflamatory statement regarding the so called "vulnerability" of the project at
the time of the flood. This statement is strictly contrary to the evidence. The project engineer, Mr. Knowlton, testified that at one time there was some vulnerability and precautions had been taken (T. 1520), but
all of the testimony indicated that at the time of the
flood, the drainage system was completely installed
and there was no reason to expect any water to cascade
upon the highway project from above. The system had
been designed to intercept these waters above relocated
Wasatch Boulevard and it was anticipated by all concerned that this would relieve the project from any
water, except that which fell immediately upon it (T.
1520, T. 1562, T. 1766, T. 1773).
Apart from the inadequacy of the evidence, there
are other established principles to support the actions
of the trial court here. First is the well recognized
rule that where answers to special interrogatories conflict, those which are in the nature of conclusions will
give way to the more specific findings. Thus, in Knape
v. Livingston Oil Co., 392 P.2d 832 (Kan. 1964), the
court said:
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It also is the rule that general findings in the
nature of conclusions, if contradicted by special
or detailed findings, cannot prevail, but are controlled by and must yield to such detailed findings of ultimate facts. (392 P.2d 832 at 845).
The court went on to hold that a finding as to
whether the defendant was guilty of negligence was
"general in nature and amounted to nothing more than
a conclusion." Again, in Gelfand v. Strohecher, supra,
the court stated:
An interrogatory which sought merely to determine whether the defendant was negligent,
without requiring the determination of the supporting facts would be improper [citing cases].
Such an interrogatory would illicit a bare conclusion without facts to support it. (1503. Supp.
655 at 663).
In Zieglasch v. Durr, 326 P.2d 295 (Kan. 1958),
the court held that a special interrogatory as to whether
the plaintiff was guilty of negligence which contributed
to the accident was a conclusion, saying:
It almost amounts to a conclusion of law. It
is therefore controlled by the undisputed facts
and the specific findings. (326 P.2d 295 at
298).
Further, in 76 Am,. Jur.2d, Trials, Section 1204,
it is said:
A special verdict should find the facts of the
case essential to a recovery and not conclusions
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of law, which are exclusively for the court. However, when a special verdict contains certain conelusions of law, but in addition states essential
facts from which the court may properly draw
conclusions as to legal liability, it is not reversible
error for the court to disregard the conclusions
of law in the special verdict and to enter the
verdict justified by the findings of fact. (Emphasis added)
In Section 1205, ibid., the additional comment appears:
Hence, a special verdict finding that one of
the parties has been guilty of negligence, without finding the primaiy fact on which the inference is based, is a mere statement of a conclusion and will not support a judgment.
It is also generally accepted that in interpreting
answers to special interrogatories, the court must look
at the answers as a whole and not single out isolated
interrogatories. Thus, in Monson v. Dupe, 299 P.2d
580 (Kan. 1956), it was held that isolated answers
could not be singled out and that to give the answers
the effect for which the appellant contended would
compel the court to ignore other answers and instructions of the trial court. I t was further held that if the
answers are consistent with each other and are sufficiently full and complete in themselves, the judgment
must follow the special findings even though they cannot be reconciled with the general verdict. See also
Bohr v. Henderson, 483 P.2d 1089 (Kan. 1971). I t

28
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

seems clear that the jury in the present case felt that
Gibbons & Reed had performed its duties under the
contract competently and that it had in all instances
complied with the plans and specifications.
Finally, Rule 49(a) itself gives the trial court a
certain latitude in connection with findings. For example, it provides that the court may make findings
on issues not submitted nor requested to be submitted
and further allows it to submit interrogatories in the
manner or form it deems most appropriate. It also
provides that where an issue is omitted without demand
that a court may make a finding or failing to do so,
"it shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord
with the judgment on the special verdict."
Plaintiffs' reliance upon First Security Bank of
Utah, N.A. v. Lwndahl, 22 U.2d 433, 454 P.2d 886
(1969), is misplaced. In that case the trial court had
made a further finding completely opposed to the findings of the jury, even though it had purportedly accepted and approved the jury's finding. This court
recognized the trial court's discretion to make corrections of errors or defects in the findings and to make
additional findings on issues that were not submitted,
but merely held that the trial court could not make
"further" findings inconsistent with those of the jury.
Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court must give
effect to the intention of the jury. Gibbons & Reed
submits that is exactly what was done in the present
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case. Plaintiffs also cite Pace v. Parish, 122 Utah 141,
247 P.2d 273 (1952). There this court merely held
that an attempt should be made if reasonably possible
to harmonize seemingly inconsistent findings. Again,
that is what was done here.
The court determined that Interrogatory J ( l ) , as
it related to plaintiffs, was submitted in error and that
there was no competent evidence to support it. While
the trial court's announced reasons for its decisions
were not reported, it is a rule followed by this and all
appellate courts that if there is any basis upon which
the actions of the trial judge can be sustained, it is
the duty of the appellate court to do so. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Davis, 1 U.2d 96, 262 P.2d 488 (1953).

CONCLUSION
The trial court concluded that the jury, in applying the applicable standard of care set forth in the instructions, had determined that Gibbons & Reed had
constructed the highway project in accordance with the
plans and specifications; that those plans and specifications were not so obviously dangerous that no reasonable contractor would follow them, and that it had performed its work with the degree of skill and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by other contractors
doing the same or similar work in this locality. These
findings were based upon clear and undisputed evid-
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ence. The trial court properly concluded that the isolated answer to Interrogatory J ( l ) was not only unsupported by the evidence, but was conclusionaiy in
nature and could not be reconciled with these more
specific findings (as well as two others) which exonerated Gibbons & Reed. Hence, it properly disrewarded that answer. To accept the plaintiffs' contentions would compel this court to ignore the facts and
disregard the intentions of the jury.

Respectfully submitted,

Ralph L. Jerman
B. L. Dart, J r .
JERMAN & DART

31
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY
DEC 6

1975

BRIGIIAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY
J. Reuben Clark Law School

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

